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1. Introduction 
Formby, Layson and Smith (henceforth FLS) in their well-known 1983 paper utilized 
Lagrangean techniques to examine the output effect of monopolistic third degree price 
discrimination under constant demand elasticity conditions.  They also examined the 
employment effect of monopsonistic third degree wage discrimination under constant 
labor supply elasticity conditions.  Recently, in this journal, Aguirre (2006) provided a 
much simple approach, the Bernoulli inequality, to show FLS’s result that monopolistic 
price discrimination increases total output under constant demand elasticity if the demand 
curves are strictly concave.  However, Aguirre didn’t consider the impact of wage 
discrimination on total employment.  It would be interesting and important to apply the 
Bernoulli inequality to investigate the employment effect of wage discrimination.  
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap.  We will set up a monopsony model with n
labor markets and examine the effect of wage discrimination on total employment by 
using the Bernoulli inequality.  It will be shown that monopsonistic wage discrimination 
increases total employment if the labor supply curves belong to the class of strictly 
concave and constant elasticity. 
2. Analysis 
Consider a monopsonistic firm which uses a single input, labor, to produce a product that 
was sold in a perfectly competitive market, e.g., FLS (1982, 1983) and Sandmo (1994). 
Assume also that the firm hires workers from all n segregated markets. The labor supply 
function in market i (i = 1, 2, 3,..., n) has constant elasticity and is given by Li(wi) = 
aiwi e i where wi = wage rate, ei = constant elasticity, ai > 0 and ei > 1. If the third degree 
wage discrimination is allowed, the firm’s problem in market i is: max πi = pq – wiLi 
where q = f(L) = ΣLi, p is determined at the perfectly competitive product market 
n 
ΣLi = L (total employment) and Σ ≡ Σ . For simplicity, we drop the index throughout the 
i=1 
paper. It should be noted that the perfectly competitive output market and the fixed
coefficient production function assumptions are not too restrictive. Ekelund, Higgins and 
Smithson pointed out that marginal revenue product is independent of monopsony’s 
ability to discriminate, (1981, 665).  FLS maintained that “the slope of MRP curve is 
directly pertinent only to the magnitude of the employment change but not to the
direction of that change.” (1982, footnote 1, 551).  Shieh (1995) showed Ekelund, 
Higgins and Smithson’s (1981) and FLS’s (1982) assertion mathematically. 
Following Boal and Ransom (1997, p. 87), via the first order condition, we obtain the
Pigou index in market i is inversely proportional to ei, i.e., 
[(p – wi*)/wi*] = (1/ei), i = 1, 2, 3, …, n (1) 
Solving (1), we obtain the optimal wage in market i 
wi* = p/[1 + (1/ei)], i = 1, 2, 3, …, n (2) 
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Thus, the monopsonistic firm will offer a higher wage in the market with the higher
elasticity of labor supply.  The employment in market i will be
 Li* = ai[pei/(1 + ei)]e i , i = 1, 2, 3, …, n (3) 
and total employment under wage discrimination would be 
L* = ΣLi* = Σ ai[pei/(1 + ei)]e i  (4) 
Under simple monopsony, the firm’s problem is: max π = pL – wL. Via the first order 
condition, the Pigou index is 
[(p – wo)/wo] = [1/e(wo)] (5) 
where e(wo) = the elasticity of the aggregate supply of labor at wo . Since L = Σ  Li, the 
weighted average of the elasticities of individual markets, e(wo), can be written as: 
e(wo) = [Σ Li’(wo)][wo/ΣLi(wo)] = Σeiai(wo)e i /Σai(wo)e i  = Σωi(wo)ei  (6) 
where Li’(wo) is dL(w)/dw at w = wo and ωi(wo) = Li(wo)/ ΣLi(wo) is the share of market i 
in total employment at the optimal uniform wage (wo). For convenience and without loss 
of generality, following FLS (1983), we assume that the units of employment (L) are 
defined so that wo = 1 and p = 1+ (1/e). With this convention, (6) can be rewritten as: 
e(1) = Σeiai/Σai  (7) 
Substituting (7) into p = 1 + [1/e(1)], we obtain 
p = Σai(1 + ei)/ Σaiei  (8) 
Further, we can obtain employment in market i, Li o = ai and total employment Lo = ΣLi o = 
Σai. 
The effect of wage discrimination on total employment can be obtained by comparing 
L* and Lo .  If L* > Lo, we can conclude that wage discrimination increases total 
employment.  Following Aguirre (2006) and Galera and Zaratiegui (2006), we will use 
the Bernoulli inequality to show that L* > Lo . According to the Bernoulli inequality, “ if
– 1 < x ≠ 0 and a >1 are real values, then (1 + x)a > 1 + ax”, Mitrinovic (1970, p. 34). Let 
(1 + x) = wi* = [pei/(1 + ei)] and a = ei > 1. The Bernoulli inequality implies that 
[pei/(1 + ei)]e i  > 1 + ei{[pei/(1 + ei)] – 1} (9) 
Given (8) we have 
[pei/(1 + ei)] – 1 = (eiΣai -Σaiei)/(1+ei)Σaiei  (10) 
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Substituting (10) into (9), we obtain 
[pei/(1 + ei)]e i > 1 + ei[(eiΣai -Σaiei)/(1+ei)Σaiei] (11) 
Multiplying both side of (11) by ai and then summing i from 1 to n, we obtain 
L* =ΣLi* = Σai[pei/(1 + ei)]e i  > Lo + Σaiei[(eiΣai -Σaiei)/(1+ei)Σaiei] (12) 
where Lo = Σai . It is clear that L* > Lo if the last term in (12) is non-negative, i.e., 
Σ{[aiei/(1 + ei)](eiΣai -Σaiei)}/Σaiei] = (1/Σaiei){Σ[aiei 2/(1 + ei)]Σai
 - Σ[aiei/(1 + ei)] Σaiei)} > 0 (13) 
Since (Σaiei) > 0, we have to check whether A = {Σ[aiei 2/(1 + ei)]Σai - Σ[aiei/(1 + ei)] 
Σaiei)}, i = 1, 2, 3,…, n is non-negative or not. 
   By using the mathematical induction method, we first obtain  
A(n = 2) = [1/(1 + e1)(1 + e2)]a1a2(e1 – e2)2 > 0 (14) 
Next, we have 
A(n + 1) = A(n) + an+1{Σ[ai(ei – en+1)2/(1 + en+1)(1 + ei)]} (15) 
Since the last term in (15) is positive, it is easy to see that if A(n) > 0 then A(n + 1) > 0. 
This shows that the sign of A is positive for any n ≥ 2. Thus L* > Lo, i.e., wage
discrimination increases total employment if the labor supply curves belong to the class 
of strictly concave and constant labor supply elasticity.  This result is consistent with FLS 
(1983, p. 896 and p. 898) and Shieh (2001, p. 186). 
3. Concluding remarks 
We have attempted to exploit an alternative but much simple way to examine the effect 
of wage discrimination on total employment.  Following Aguirre (2006) and Galera and 
Zaratiegui (2006), we utilize the Bernoulli inequality to show that the wage 
discrimination always increases total employment if the labor supply curves are strictly 
concave and have constant supply elasticity. We obtain this result with a much simple
way without resorting to complicated manipulations as were used by FLS (1983) and 
Shieh (2001). 
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